יז אלא אמר ריש לקיש הכל היו בכלל נזק שלם כשפרט לך הכתוב רעהו גבי תם רעהו הוא דתם משלם חצי נזק מכלל דהקדש בין תם בין מועד משלם נזק שלם
17 <b><i>GEMARA</i></b>. The [ruling in the] Mishnah is not in accordance with [the view of] R. Simeon b. Menasya; for it was taught: Where a private ox has gored consecrated cattle or where consecrated cattle has gored a private ox, there is not liability, as it is stated: The ox of his neighbour,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 211, n. 5. ');"><sup>15</sup></span> not [that is to say] an ox consecrated to the Temple. R. Simeon b. Menasya, however, says: Where consecrated cattle has gored a private ox there is no liability, but if a private ox has gored consecrated cattle, whether while <i>Tam</i> or <i>mu'ad</i>, payment is to be made for full damage.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. supra p. 23. ');"><sup>16</sup></span> I might ask, what was the principle adopted by R. Simeon? If the implication of 'his neighbour'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 211, n. 5. ');"><sup>15</sup></span> has to be insisted upon,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To mean the ox of his peer, of his equal. [This would not exclude Gentiles in general as the term [H], his neighbour applies also to them (cf. Ex. XI, 2); cf. next page.] ');"><sup>17</sup></span> why then even in the case of a private ox goring consecrated cattle should there not be exemption? If on the other hand the implication of 'his neighbour' has not to be insisted upon, why then in the case of consecrated cattle goring a private ox should there also not be liability? If, however, you argue that he<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Simeon ');"><sup>18</sup></span> does in fact maintain that the implication of 'his neighbour' has to be insisted upon, yet where a private ox has gored consecrated cattle there is a special reason for liability inferred by means of an <i>a fortiori</i> argument from the case of private cattle [as follows]: If where a private ox has gored private cattle there is liability, should not there be all the more liability where it has gored consecrated cattle? Why then [did he] not employ the principle of Dayyo<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra p. 126. ');"><sup>19</sup></span> [i.e. that it was sufficient] that the object<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Viz. consecrated cattle. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> to which the inference is made should be on the same footing as the object from which it was made?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Viz. private cattle. ');"><sup>21</sup></span> And since <i>Tam</i> involves there the payment of half damages, [why then should it not] here also involve the payment of half damages [only]? — Resh Lakish therefore said: Originally all cases came under the law of full compensation;<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As in the case of mu'ad where in contradistinction to Tam no mention was made of 'his neighbour': cf. Ex. XXI, 36. ');"><sup>22</sup></span> when Scripture therefore particularised 'his neighbour' in the case of <i>Tam</i>, it meant that it was only where damage had been done to a neighbour that <i>Tam</i> would involve half damages [only], thus implying that where the damage had been done to consecrated property, whether by <i>Tam</i> or <i>Mu'ad</i>, the compensation must be in full;